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Civil-Military Relations in Turkey:
Toward a Liberal Model?
METİN HEPER
Department of Political Science, Bilkent University
ABSTRACT In Republican Turkey, the military has always had respect for democracy.
However, from 1960 onwards, the military intervened in politics on four occasions. This
was because it felt responsible for dealing with internal as well external threats to the
country. From 2002 onwards, however, the military began to openly question the very
wisdom of intervening in politics. In the following years, the military seemed to have come
close to thinking that the civilians “have the right to be wrong.”
In Turkey, the military has always accepted the fact that the civilians have the last
word. However, since 1960 it took power into its hands on three different occasions
in 1960, 1971, and 1980; and once put pressure on a government to resign in 1997,
for the military did not trust civilians. Kenan Evren, the Chief of General Staff in
March 1978–July 1983 and the leader of the 1980 junta, once observed:
We were afraid that if, following the military interventions, a political party
leader we would not approve of comes to power everything that we had
worked so hard to achieve may be done away with.1
Necip Torumtay who was chief of general staff from July 1987 until December 1990,
did not think differently:
We came to the conclusion that our liberty, independence, and progress
towards contemporary civilization were dependent upon our safeguarding the
secular and democratic Turkish republic and the Atatürkian principles.2
Doğan Güreş, chief of general staff in December 1990–August 1994, pointed out
that in Turkey the duties of the military included “safeguarding the modernistic and
secular features of the Turkish republic. . . [and] defending the country against its
internal and external enemies.”3
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Yet, from the early 1980s onwards, at least some members of the top brass began to
have second thoughts about the wisdom of the military’s intervention in politics and,
from 2002 onwards, those commanders have given signals that the military may
begin to act not unlike their contemporaries in liberal democracies. In 1982,
Admiral Nejat Tümer, a member of the 1980 five-strong junta, asked polemically
the present author and a colleague of the latter whether or not they should have inter-
vened in 1980. He then went on to point out that interventions have an adverse effect
on the military itself because the promotion process is disrupted; lower-ranked offi-
cers may also be inclined to intervene when they get promoted to the top command;
and that in any case interventions are able to set things right only in the short-term.
General Hilmi Özkök, Chief of General Staff in 2002–2006, had similar views.
For one thing Özkök did not perceive modernization as merely an outward appear-
ance, but primarily a thinking pattern for “evaluating different options and selecting
the best one.”4 Consequently, Özkök took Atatürkism, the guiding light of the
Turkish military, as a world view open to change, not as an ideology, i.e., a closed
system of thought. Consequently, for the most part Özkök did not repeat such
worn-out clichés as, “The military is the guardian of the republic, in particular its
secular premises.” In fact, Özkök thought the officers should have a new vision,
not being satisfied with just emulating the past. There was a need for widening intel-
lectual horizons of officers so that they would be able to re-interpret Atatürkism,
comprising the founding principles of the Turkish Republic. Atatürkism had repeat-
edly been used as a justification for military activism and intervention since 1960.5
Not unlike Admiral Tümer, General Özkök, too, questioned the very wisdom of
military interventions. In his opinion, those interventions were not successful: the
politicians who had been banned from active politics were able to return to active
politics. It was, therefore, high time for the military to have greater trust in the
people’s judgement. Accordingly, every institution should attend to its own business,
not interfere in the affairs of the others.6 On August 24, 2005 Özkök explained why
he thought so:
The duties and functions of the military [in Turkey, too] have been designated
by law and the Turkish Armed Forces are expected to conform to that legis-
lation. Since those laws were enacted by the representatives of the people,
the situation in Turkey does not deviate from the universally valid principle
of “civilian control over military.’’ What differentiates the Turkish case from
others is the special relationship between the people and the military.7
Özkök also had plans to revise the curriculum of the military schools in order to
bring up a new generation of officers who would have trust in the people’s
judgement.8
Özkök was also of the opinion that pious people might pursue secular politics. He
wished to develop a modus vivendi with the Justice and Development Party (AKP).
At times, he changed his mind when the AKP government came up with a persuasive































commanders at the top particularly about “the hidden agenda” of the AKP govern-
ment.9 When he spoke up, often he seemed to appease the detractors of the AKP gov-
ernment within the military: “The February 28 was the consequence of certain
developments in Turkey. The effect would not be different if the cause continues
to exist.”10
In August 2006, General Yaşar Büyükanıt succeeded General Özkök as Chief
General Staff and stayed in post for two years. In his discourse and praxis, Büyükanıt,
on the one hand, gave the impression that he considered himself as the guardian of the
founding philosophy of the republic as well as internal and external security of the
country; and on the other hand, he conceded that the last word belonged to civilians.
On the whole, however, as compared to the pre-2002 chiefs of general staff, Büyü-
kanıt seemed to be less willing to make resort to direct military intervention even
if the government acted in a manner diametrically opposed to his preferences.
Indeed, on some occasions, Büyükanıt came up with the following observations:
(1) “The TAF is obliged by the relevant legislation to take action against all groups
who target the unitary system of the state and act as the guardian of the premises
of the Turkish Republic, which are stipulated in the first three Articles of the
Constitution. The military does not have the luxury of deciding itself which of
its duties it will perform and which ones it will not” (August 28, 2006);
(2) “There is no doubt that individual is important. However, while deifying the
individual how . . . reasonable it would be to weaken the state? One should not
forget what our sublime leader Atatürk once said: ‘If what is at stake is fatherland
[read, homeland], other considerations can be overlooked’” (October 1, 2007)
While Büyükanıt was Chief of General Staff, a statement placed on the website of
the office of Chief of General Staff expressed the military’s objection to the
election of the candidate of the AKP government, Abdullah Gül, as President.
Later, Büyükanıt let it be known that he himself had penned that statement. In the
event, Gül was elected President by the AKP-controlled parliament. Against all
expectations, Büyükanıt accepted this outcome with grace.
This particular stance on the part of Büyükanıt must have been due to his
sincerity concerning the principle of civilians having the last word. On one occasion,
Büyükanıt made the following statement:
Can one find . . . [even one] undemocratic statement by the military? Nobody
[including the military] is and may be against democratic values and the use
of democratic rights [by the people or their representatives] (October 2,
2006).11
This democratic stance was also reflected in his account of how the military had
responded to the re-structuring by Parliament of the Turkish legal system in accord-
ance with the Copenhagen criteria whereby, among other things, the number of the
civilian members of the National Security Council (NSC) was increased; the NSC






























no longer recommended measures to which the Council of Ministers were to attribute
priority, but conveyed views upon request and the Council of Ministers assessed the
views conveyed to it; the NSC was deprived of its executive powers, such as request-
ing reports from government agencies on how they were dealing with the threats for
which the NSC had recommended specific measures; and a civilian secretary-general
was to be appointed to the NSC.
Büyükanıt narrated what transpired at the time as follows:
During the deliberations on the . . . [relevant] reform package, we conveyed our
views to the government. Some were accepted, others were not. Now that the
parliament enacted them into law, it is our duty to comply with them. We only
hope that our concerns and worries prove to be groundless.12
Here it should also be noted that on May 4, 2007, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan and Büyükanıt had an informal meeting at Dolmabahçe Palace in Istanbul
and neither have disclosed what they discussed. One may conclude that they had
mutual trust and thus a working relationship.
Finally, Büyükanıt as well as Özkök supported Turkey’s becoming a full member
of the European Union, seeing it as the final stage of Turkey’s Europeanization
project. Özkök stated: “. . . the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) had played a pioneering
role in the modernization of Turkey. The TAF always favours Turkey’s becoming a
member of the EU.”13 Büyükanıt observed that the TAF is “an unyielding defender of
. . . a secular and democratic state. This fundamental stance of the military is in full
concert with the EU world view.”14 The EU’s Copenhagen criteria involve a
liberal version civil-military relation, and no doubt, both Özkök and Büyükanıt
had been aware of it.
Next Chief of General Staff, General İlker Başbuğ served in post in August 2008–
August 2010. Başbuğ, too, made a reference to the responsibility of the TAF to
uphold the founding philosophy of the republic. On August 28, 2008, he stated:
Our sublime leader Atatürk has rendered the Turkish Armed Forces responsible
for safeguarding the Turkish Republic, which he set to march on the road to
contemporary civilization with the guidance of the Republican principles and
positive sciences, from all threats.
On the other hand, Başbuğ has remained loyal to the Hilmi Özkök line concerning
the civil-military relations in Turkey. On the latter issue, he made the following
points:
(1) “Democracy is the most important characteristic of Republic. Turkish Armed
Forces has respect for democracy” (August 29, 2008);
(2) “According to [Samuel P.] Huntington, the most effective control over the mili-
tary is ‘objective control.’ Objective control means rendering the military a pro-































politics.” According to Başbuğ, the military’s functions comprised, “determining
the military’s needs and formulating policy options and proposing them to the
civilian government, and implementing the relevant decisions made by that
government” (April 14, 2009);
(3) “Some of the issues we deal with are also political matters. Concerning such
issues, it is our duty to convey to the government our views and make our
recommendations. We are aware of the fact that it is not our responsibility to
make recommendations on all issues, particularly the domestic ones. We
express our opinions and views at the National Security Council meetings, in
our meetings with prime minister and other ministers, and from time to time at
press conferences. Our views would be expressed by me as chief of general
staff or the officers I authorize” (September 16–17, 2008);
(4) “It is not appropriate to perceive the Turkish Armed Forces as an obstacle to plur-
alism” (April 14, 2009).
Başbuğ himself initiated weekly meetings with the prime minister. Until Başbuğ,
Chiefs of General Staff had weekly visits only with the president of the Republic, but
not with the prime minister. Not unlike Büyükanıt and Prime Minister Erdoğan,
Başbuğ and Erdoğan, too, informally got together and discussed matters when one
or the other or both deemed necessary. Başbuğ by his own volition also gave a brief-
ing to the Council of Ministers on the Kurdish separatism in Turkey, which he sees as
a matter of internal security and by implication gave the message that that issue was
the responsibility of the government.
Early on as a Chief of General Staff, Başbuğ did not make public declarations
and did not allow other officers to make such statements. Again early on,
Başbuğ kept to a minimum his relations with the media. In the few media con-
ferences he held, Başbuğ addressed himself only to matters of security, inter-
preted in a narrow sense, and to criticisms directed to the TAF. In one of his
media conferences he had particularly emphasized that “The Turkish Armed
Forces would not provide shelter to those in its ranks who oppose democracy”
(June 26, 2009).
Then the Ergenekon case surfaced. It was claimed by the civilian chief prosecutor’s
office that from approximately 2003 onwards, some retired or commissioned officers,
including a number of retired four-star force commanders, were plotting to topple the
AKP government on the grounds that that party had the hidden agenda of bringing
back a state based on political Islam. This was followed by interrogations, detentions,
and/or arrests of a number of officers, who were suspected of having been involved
in the Ergenekon case. Moreover, some officers, again including the top generals and
admirals, were treated as if they were fugitive suspects, i.e. being picked from their
places by the police in the early hours of the morning and held under custody for long
periods without having been told why those actions were taken against them.15
Alongside those developments, the military was heavily criticized by the media for
its “sloppy” performance in its fight against the armed separatist PKK (Kurdistan
Workers’ Party) militants in the southeast, and for the continuing loss of officers






























and enlisted men. At times the media also did not distinguish between those claimed
to be involved in the Ergenekon and the military as an institution.
Although earlier Başbuğ had been careful of not making any public declarations,
upon these developments he did come up with such public declarations. Those
declarations, however, were not directed at the government. Başbuğ simply resented
the “facts” that the security forces were at times not adequately attentive to the
sensibilities of officers and that the media often was prejudiced in its reporting.
Here it should also be mentioned that at some point Prime Minister Erdoğan too,
felt the need to point out that, “If some people in an institution are engaged in
some wrongdoings, that institution as a whole should not be held responsible.”16
President Abdullah Gül, too, was concerned about the way the media conducted
itself. He stated:
Sometimes when engaged in a debate and/or expressing themselves, some
people go beyond what are proper limits. This is particularly the case when
it comes to the military. We should all refrain from defaming the military as
well as the police and intelligence.17
Başbuğ essentially did not block the legal procedures into the Ergenekon case,
even when some middle- and very high-ranked officers were interrogated, taken
into custody, arrested, and/or when legal suits were filed against them. When legal
objections on some procedural matters were made by some officers, Başbuğ was
reluctant to hand over such officers to the police forces until after a ruling was
made on those objections. In any case, as one round of interrogations, detentions,
and arrests followed the previous ones, Başbuğ’s cooperation with the police
increased.18
Başbuğ attempted to have his own way concerning the military appointments to the
very top ranks, including the posts of Chief of General Staff and force commanders.
When, in August 2010, Prime Minister Erdoğan had reservations for the appointment
of the four-star general Hasan Iğsız as the army commander, for a couple of days
Başbuğ did not come up with an alternative nomination, but then gave in without
making any fuss about it.
All seemed to have ended well when in February 2010 President Gül called upon
Erdoğan and Başbuğ for a summit meeting among the three of them. It has been
reported that at that meeting both Erdoğan and Başbuğ put on the table their respect-
ive discomforts concerning the relations between the government and the military,
and came to an understanding how those relations may improve in the future.19
An Exercise in Making Head or Tail of Recent Developments
There has been a long-lingering debate on whether the “objective” or “subjective”
control of the military, i.e., whether the professionalism on the part of the military
or the effective control of the military by civilians is a better formula to prevent































on this matter was that the autonomy of the military on strictly military matters made
possible the development of professionalism on the part of the military; the military
would recognize the limits of their professionalism, adopt a stance of political neu-
trality, and thus the military would act in a subordinate manner to civilian govern-
ment.20 In contrast, S. E. Finer has suggested that professionalism may actually
encourage political activism and render civilian control problematic. This is
because the military may start perceiving itself close to the state rather than to politi-
cal government and, at the same time, the military would be able to act more decisi-
vely. In the process, the military may be more prone to intervene in politics and can
more easily remove governments from power.21
Huntington’s theory of the civilian control over the military cannot explain the
Turkish case. On the other hand, the pre-2002 civil-military relations in Turkey
may be explained by Finer’s theory. From the last decades of the nineteenth
century onward, the military in Turkey had been the object of modernization. Officers
began to attend schools with Westernized curricula at the end of the nineteenth
century. In the early twentieth century German officers acted as reformers of the mili-
tary and Enver Pasha as Minister of War introduced some further reforms. The mili-
tary’s modernization accelerated with Turkey’s joining NATO in 1952. Presently, the
Turkish military is considered to be one of the three militaries in the world that can
effectively engage in cross-border operations.22
In any case, the post-2002 military has certainly perceived itself as a professional
institution and it was proud of that fact. Özkök talked of the Turkish military as “an
institution based on meritocracy. Those serving in the said military would be pro-
moted on the basis of successful performance” (August 24, 2005).23 In Özkök’s
opinion, “office of the chief of general staff was the university for the Turkish
Armed Forces” (August 28, 2006).24 And on October 1, 2007, Özkök’s successor
Büyükanıt told cadets in the Turkish War Academy:
Years ago, Henry Fayol has noted that in order for an administrator to improve
the functioning of an organization, s/he should do planning, organizing, coor-
dinating, implementing, and controlling. . . . As Socrates said, all analyses
should start with the correct definitions of the concepts involved. Unless this
is done, the conclusions reached would not be the right ones.
Büyükanıt also pointed out that “the Turkish Armed Forces welcome criticisms
directed against it. The military would benefit from those criticisms, provided that
they are in conformity with science, logic, and empirical reality” (October 2, 2006).25
Yet in Turkey, the military has become not only the object of modernization, but
also the subject of modernization. Consequently, one of the enduring traits of the
Turkish military has been devotion to the secular modernizing reforms set in train
by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of Turkey.26 For a long time, for officers
modernization meant Westernization, and an important component of Westernization
was taken to be democracy. However, because their starting point was modernization,
the officers’ preference was for “rational democracy,” that is, taking democracy as an






























intelligent debate among the educated for the purpose of arriving at the best policy
option.27 Furthermore, in Turkey not all civilian governments have been able to suc-
cessfully deal with the critical problems faced by the country.
Consequently, the military had always been bothered by the absence of profession-
alism on the part of politicians. The military often looked down upon the latter
because of their low confidence in the competence of civilian governments.28 Conse-
quently, professionalism on the part of the military has not led to the civilian control
of that institution; on the contrary, the military was inclined to monitor the doings of
civilian governments and when the military came to the conclusion that the civilian
governments were not handling the problems the military considered critical in a
proper manner, the military got into the picture in one way or another.
Under the circumstances, in Turkey, the subjective control of the military, too,
could not be achieved. In 1960–2002, it was always the military that had attempted
to re-structure political life when it deemed it necessary. Following the military inter-
ventions new constitutions were adopted or the existing ones were amended; changes
were also made in such important legislation as political parties act. On the other
hand, the provisions that “the military is responsible for defending and guarding
both the Turkish fatherland and the Turkish Republic as defined by the Consti-
tution”29 and that the “Turkish Armed Forces shall defend the country against the
internal as well as the external threats if necessary by force”30 remained unchanged.
It must have been for this reason that when the civilian government enacted laws that
clipped the powers of the military in its efforts to render Turkey a full member of the
European Union, General Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu, chief of general staff in August 1998–
August 2002, stated that “if necessary the guardianship role of the military over poli-
tics in Turkey would continue one thousand years!”31
When it comes to the post-2002 civil-military relations in Turkey, it may be
suggested that those relations resembled what Morris Janowitz has predicted to
happen when the military becomes professionalized. In this regard, Janowitz has
made two significant points:
(1) The politicization of the military was inevitable given the fact that [in the late
1950s] the Western world faced a serious Soviet threat, this having had an
impact not only on international, but also on domestic politics, thus the profes-
sionalized military’s inclination to participate in the public decision-making
process because of the deadly threat the country faced;
(2) That the effective civilian control over the military depends not only on the mili-
tary becoming professionalized, but also on the military having internalized
professional ethics, i.e., that the civilians should have the last word. The latter
is a consequence of law, tradition, and the military’s increased familiarity with
and respect for civilian values and institutions and also of the self-imposed
professional standards.32
The first point Janowitz has come up with—when a country faces an external threat































the activist role the military in Turkey played from the late 1950s to 2002. During
those years, Turkey had been situated in a rather unstable geography. Furthermore,
since 1950 and even more so since 1970, the military thought that secularism thus
national unity in that country faced a serious threat. Moreover, from the late 1970s
onwards, in the opinion of the military in that country, not only national unity but
more ominously the territorial integrity of Turkey has been in jeopardy because of
the Kurdish separatism in that country.
The second point that Janowitz has made—that the effective civilian control over
military depends not only on the military becoming professionalized, but also upon
military by its own volition internalizing the principle of the civilian supremacy
over the military—has been supported and elaborated by others, too. For instance,
Douglas L. Bland has argued that,
Ideas embedded in institutions constrain policies and behavior. . . . The best one
can say, perhaps, is that civil-military relations, in mature liberal democracies
stand on the willing obedience of officers to civil authority, not because officers
always respect the idea of the civil authority, but because they value above else
a liberal democracy. . . . Once the military adopts such a stance, it would then go
along with the dictum, “Civilians have the right to be wrong” and it would not
play a guardian role even if in its view civilians made a “mess of things.”33
The post-2002 civil-military relations in Turkey seem to be moving in the same
general direction. What Chief of General Staff Başbuğ pointed out in his address
to the cadets at the Turkish War Academy on April 14, 2009 was in line with that
gradual transformation. Başbuğ stated:
When officers convey their views and make recommendations [to govern-
ments], they assume that their views will be considered important and thus
will be taken into account. It is obvious that the final decision will be made
by civilian governments. However, it should be kept in mind that on those
occasions where the recommendations of the military are given short shrift
and thus adverse consequences ensue; only the civilian governments will be
responsible.
In the pre-2002 period, the Chiefs of General Staff had conceived of themselves as
national political overseers; they had thought that when the national interest was in
peril, they should set things right because the civilian governments could not. The
discourse and praxis of the post-2002 chiefs provide ample evidence that they no
longer consider themselves as national political overseers. They still think that on
some matters, including matters of internal security interpreted in a wide sense,
they are indispensable if the goal is that of formulating the best policies.
Indeed, in his April above-mentioned address in the War Academy, Başbuğ at one
point made a reference to a speech by President Obama’s National Security Adviser






























Rt. General J. Jones at the 45th Munich Conference on February 8, 2009. In that
speech, Jones had made the following remarks:
The President has made clear that to succeed against the 21st century chal-
lenges, the United States should use, balance, and integrate all elements of
national influence: our military and our diplomacy, our economy and our intel-
ligence, and law enforcement capacity, our cultural outreach, and the power of
moral example, in short our values. Given this role, [our] National Security
Council is by definition at the nexus of that effort. It integrates on a strategic
sense all elements of our national security community toward the development
of effective policy development and interagency cooperation.34
However, despite the fact that they think they should play a critical role in the for-
mulation of the internal as well as the external security policies, Başbuğ as well as
Özkök and Büyükanıt seemed to have conceded that in the last analysis the “civilians
have the right to be wrong.”
Consequently, Özkök, Büyükanıt and Başbuğ continued to closely monitor politi-
cal, economic, and social problems the country faces, but now wished to share the
responsibility to deal with those issues with civilian governments as well as societal
groups. At least Özkök and Başbuğ expressed this particular inclination on their part.
On August 24, 2005, Özkök said:
Today the most critical problem Turkey faces is separatist terror. In order to
deal with this problem every group and institution should itself be responsible
for the resolution of this threat and contribute to the joint effort of dealing with
it.35
While on September 5, 2008, Başbuğ said “The fight against the separatist terror
should be conducted not only by the state, but also by the civil societal institutions
and the people.”36
Conclusion
What are the reasons for the fact that in the past the military in Turkey has never
attempted to stay in power indefinitely when it intervened, and in the post-2002
period, the military’s relations with the civilian government increasingly came to
resemble the corresponding best practice in liberal democracies? One may mention
three reasons here. First is the guiding light of the Republic, Atatürkism, which
has placed emphasis on (1) Turkey’s catching up with the contemporary civilization,
an integral dimension of which was democracy; and (2) On the general interest at the
expense of group interests.
It was thus not surprising that when the military intervened, it accused politicians,
not democracy itself. Also, when the military intervened, it did not try to promote its































power for a long time. All in all, the military in Turkey perceived democracy as an
end, not as a means.
Secondly, Atatürkism was also construed by its formulator as a cognitive revolu-
tion, aiming to replace dogmatic thinking with critical thinking. Thus, following his
becoming Chief of General Staff in 2002, Özkök began to take Atatürkism as a criti-
cal thinking so much so that, concerning the civil military-relations in Turkey, he
even implied that the earlier Atatürkism of the military had been a product of
dogmatic thinking.
Thirdly, critical thinking on the part of the post-2002 chiefs of general staff
rendered them open to change. Özkök on March 16, 2006 stated:
We live in an age where even those [scientific] approaches and methods on the
appropriateness of which there has long been an agreement, rapidly become
obsolete. It is of course necessary to read old books; however, what is more
important is that one should also come up with new ideas of his/her own.
. . . One should be innovative and have foresight.37
Along the same lines, Büyükanıt declared on October 1, 2007:
In our current stage of progress, we should realize that several of our past
“rights” have proven to be wrong. Those who are not conscious of this fact,
always repeat themselves. One should question even some military traditions
that not many have the courage to challenge.38
The military’s taking democracy as an end, its adoption of Atatürkism as a critical
thinking, its recent stance of being open to change brought the civil-military relation
in Turkey close to those relations in liberal democracies. It seems from 2002 onwards,
the High Command has arrived at the conclusion that the military should no longer
play a guardian role even if in its view civilians made a “mess of things.”39
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16. Hasan Celal Güzel, “Statüko Değişirken” (“As the Status Quo Goes through Change”), Radikal
(Istanbul daily), December 29, 2009.
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